

Bribery Games – A meta-analysis


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Motivation



“(...) let’s not mince words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption.”

J.D. Wolfensohn (1996) *President of the World Bank Group*



[Comment](#) | [Published: 12 January 2011](#)

Corruption kills

[Nicholas Ambraseys & Roger Bilham](#)

Nature **469**, 153–155 (13 January 2011) | [Download Citation](#) ↓

On the anniversary of Haiti’s devastating quake, Nicholas Ambraseys and Roger Bilham calculate that 83% of all deaths from building collapse in earthquakes over the past 30 years occurred in countries that are anomalously corrupt.



Corruption in EU costs '120bn euros' - EU Commission

3 February 2014 Last updated at 16:32 GMT

The EU’s Home Affairs Commissioner has warned of staggering levels of corruption in member countries.

Corruption: One word, many meanings

- Loose use of the term in public parlour and media
- Can refer to anything that is rotten, a state going from good to bad
- Has a **long** history
- Widely used definition across academic fields:
“abuse of entrusted power for private gains”

Types of corrupt behaviors

Individual corruption

- Solitary act, No corrupt partner involved
- Examples: Embezzlement, Stealing time...




Interpersonal corruption

- Corrupt collaboration, Multiple agents involved
- Examples: Bribery, Kick backs...



How to measure corruption?

Perception –based measures




Behavioral measures

OECD Public Governance Reviews




Behavioural Insights for Public Integrity

HARNESSING THE HUMAN FACTOR TO COUNTER CORRUPTION





Methodology

Victim



Bribery Games



Individual cheating

- Preference for truth telling

(Abeler et al. 2019, *Econometrica*)

- More lying in die-roll tasks compared to matrix task

(Gerlach et al. 2019, *Psych Bull*)

- Intuitive dishonesty, when abstract victims get hurt

(Köbis et al., 2019 *Perspect. Psychol. Sci.*)

Bribery Games – A meta-analysis

Call via:

- *ESA, SJDM, EADM, AOM OB, SPPS, EASP, IAREP*

Inclusion criteria::

- The study uses an **incentivized** (financial or non-financial incentives), **behavioral paradigm**, i.e., no hypothetical set-ups
- that entails a **transaction between at least two players** that is **mutually beneficial**
- in which **power asymmetry** exists between the agents
- and the successful transaction between agents creates **negative externalities** (that can be on other players or more general entities, e.g. deduction of a donation for a charitable cause)



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Online search:

- Boolean Operators:


- [*“bribery game” OR “corruption game” OR “bribery experiment” OR “bribery paradigm”*]

- data bases:

- *Web of Science, PsycINFO, GoogleScholar (using Publish or Perish), Econlit*



PRISMA Chart



Overall results

- Bribe offers:

Overall results

- Bribe offers: 64.13%

Overall results


- Bribe offers: 64.13%
- Bribe acceptance:

Overall results


- Bribe offers: 64.13%
- Bribe acceptance: 71.23%
- $\text{Log}(OR) = -0.348$; 95%CI[-0.5585; -0.1375], $Z=-3.24$, $p= .0012$
- People accept bribes more than they offer
- Higher than individual tasks (see also Weisel & Shalvi, 2015)
- Less likely to resist temptation than instigating it




Punishment




Punishment



Punishment



While stochastic, external punishment reduces bribery, Peer punishment slightly increases bribery



SCORE

Highly Corrupt




Very Clean

0-8 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100




Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Offers





Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Offers


$B = 0.0028,$
 $SE = 0.0074,$
 $Z = 0.37,$
 $p = .711$





Corruption Perception Index & Bribe Acceptance

$B = 0.0213,$
 $SE = 0.0079,$
 $Z = 2.6926,$
 $p = .0071$



Explaining heterogeneity

Different types of bribery:

- Passive:

- Extortive bribery (e.g. Banerjee, 2016; Banerjee et al. 2017)

- Active:

- Competitive bribery (e.g. Gneezy et al., 2017; Köbis et al., 2015; 2017)
- Collusive bribery (e.g. Abbink et al., 2001; 2018; Barr & Serra, 2008)

Additional moderators

- Punishment regimes
- Size of incentives
- Size of externalities
- Sample composition
- Whistleblowing
- Framing
- Demographics (gender, age, education) ...

1. Offers < acceptance

- temptation vs. instigation

2. Stochastic punishment reduces bribery, peer punishment not

3. Behavior vs. perception

- No link of bribe bribery with CPI or GCB

--> Systematic distinction between bribery measures to enable theoretical advances

Thank you!

- n.c.kobis@gmail.com
- <https://soundcloud.com/kickback-gap>

